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THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
PART Ill 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the third in a series of articles examining 
the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal 
cases. 
RULE 501: PRIVILEGES 
Rule 501 is the only provision governing the law 
of privilege in the Rules of Evidence. Rule 501 
does not create any privileges; instead, it provides 
that the law of privilege is governed by statute 
enacted by the General Assembly and by the com-
mon law. Consequently, the Rules of Evidence do 
not change the Ohio law of privilege. Although not 
specifically enumerated in Rule 501, constitu-
tionally-based privileges also apply in Ohio trials. 
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1 (1964) (5th Amend-
ment applicable in state trials); Ohio Canst., art. I, 
§ 10. 
RULE 601: COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES 
Rule 601 provides that "[e)very person is a com-
petent witness." There are five exceptions to this 
general provision, three of which are important in 
criminal cases. 
Persons of Unsound Mind 
Rule 601(A) provides that persons of unsound 
mind who appear incapable of receiving or relating 
impressions are incompetent. This provision is 
based on RC 2317.01. The Staff Note employs the 
term "insane persons" in describing this rule. This 
description is misleading. The tests for insanity 
and competency are not the same. In State v. 
Wildman, 145 OS 379, 61 NE(2d) 790 (1945), the 
Supreme Court commented: 
Under the trend of modern decisions the fact that a 
witness is insane does not necessarily exclude him 
from the witness stand .... 
Ordinarily the presumption is that persons who are 
called as witnesses are competent ... , but this pre-
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
sumption may be overcome by a proper showing. Ac-
cording to the general rule, the question of compe-
tency lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge, 
and, if he permits a witness of unsound mind to 
testify, his action in so doing is not a ground of rever-
sal at the behest of an aggreived party, unless there 
is an abuse of discretion .... 
A person who is able to correctly state matters 
which have come within his perception, with respect 
to the issues involved, and appreciates and under-
stands the nature and obligation of an oath is a com-
petent witness notwithstanding some unsoundness of 
mind. /d. at 385-86. 
Children Under Ten Years of Age 
Rule 601 (A) provides that children under ten 
years of age who appear incapable of receiving or 
relating impressions are incompetent. This provi-
sion is based on RC 2317.01. 
If the witness' capacity to perceive is in issue, it 
is the age at the time of the transaction about 
which the witness testifies that is controlling and 
not the age at the time of trial. In Huprich v. Paul 
W. Varga & Sons, Inc., 3 OS(2d) 87, 209 NE(2d) 390 
(1965), the Court held: "Where a witness is over ten 
years of age when he testifies but was under ten 
at the time of the happenings about which he pro-
poses to testify, the capability of such witness to 
receive 'just impressions' of such happenings 
must nece_ssarily be determined as of the time of 
those hapenings." /d. (syllabus, para. 1). The court 
went on to state that "it was the duty of the trial 
court to determine, after examination, the compe-
tency of the proffered witness ... [B]oth counsel 
are entitled to present relevant evidence subject to 
the control of the trial court as to the mental capa-
city of the witness to observe accurately and 
recollect, including expert witnesses and testi-
mony." /d. at 90-91. Accord, City of Berea v. 
Petcher, 119 App 165, 188 NE(2d) 605 (1963) (court 
must hold hearing on competency of child under 
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ten years of age). 
Spouses in Criminal Cases 
Rule 601(B) provides that a witness-spouse is in-
competent to testify against a defendant-spouse in 
a criminal case unless the charged offense in-
volves a crime against the testifying spouse or the 
children of either spouse. This testimonial 
privilege or disqualification must be distinguished 
from the privilege relating to confidential com-
munications between spouses. The confidential 
communication privilege is recognized in RC 
2317.02(C) and RC 2945.42, and is governed by 
Rule 501. 
On January 14, 1981 the Supreme Court promul-
gated an amendment to Rule 601. See 54 Ohio Bar 
175 (1981). The amendment abolishes the testi-
monial spousal privilege in criminal cases. If not 
disapproved by the General Assembly, the amend-
ment becomes effective on July 1, 1981. See Ohio 
Canst., art. IV, § 5(8). 
Law Enforcements Officers in Traffic Cases 
Rule 601(C) provides that a law enforcement of-
ficer is incompetent as a witness if (1) on duty ex-
clusively or for the "main purpose" of enforcing 
traffic laws, (2) arrests or assists in the arrest of a 
misdemeanor offender, and (3) is not in a properly 
marked vehicle or legally distinctive uniform as 
prescribed by statute. This provision is based upon 
RC 4549.14 and RC 4549.16. The term "traffic 
laws" includes municipal ordinances. City of 
Dayton v. Adams, 9 OS(2d) 89, 223 NE(2d) 822 
(1967). Adams involved the use of radar. Although 
the "chase vehicle" was properly marked, the vehi-
cle in which the radar unit was located was not 
properly marked. The Court held the officer in the 
radar car was not competent under the statute. 
Whether the arresting officer's "main purpose" 
involved enforcing traffic laws has been the sub-
ject of several decisions. In City of Columbus v. 
Stump, 41 App(2d) 81, 322 NE(2d) 348 (1974), the 
court upheld the competency of an arresting of-
ficer who was not in a distinctively marked vehicle 
and who was working undercover at the time of 
the arrest: 
"Main purpose" must involve the complete assign-
ment of duty for the ... police officer for the "trick" 
he worked as a whole. If that assignment included 
narcotics control efforts and the patrolling of the city 
for protection against the many forms of law break-
ing, then it cannot be said that traffic control was the 
"main purpose" of his assignment that night .... The 
entire duty of the officer, be multiple or single, must 
be respected and to do otherwise flies in the face of 
the intent of the legislature ... /d. at 84-85. 
See also State v. Thobe, 91 Ohio LAbs 92, 191 NE(2d) 
182 (Ct App 1961); State v. Maxwell, 60 Misc.1,395 
NE(2d) 531 (Mun Ct 1978). 
RULE 602: LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Rule 602 codifies the firsthand knowledge rule. 
The rule is subject to Rule 703 which specifies the 
bases for expert opinion testimony. Under that pro-
vision an expert may base his opinion on either 
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personal knowledge or evidence admitted at the 
trial or proceeding. A lay witness also may give an 
opinion, but Rule 701 requires such opinions be 
based on firsthand knowledge. 
In Cleveland, Terminal and Valley R. Co. v. 
Marsh, 63 OS 236, 58 NE 821 (1900), the Court ex-
plained the firsthand knowledge requirement as 
follows: 
It is error to allow a witness to testify, over the objec-
tion of the other side, as to the identity of a person, 
without first qualifying himself by showing he has 
some knowledge on the subject. (syllabus, para. 1) 
A witness should testify in accordance with the 
knowledge he has at the time of testifying, and is not 
confined to the knowledge he may have had at a 
previous time. (syllabus para. 2) 
Because it is often difficult to distinguish be-
tween what a witness knows and what a witness 
thinks he knows, Rule 602 alters the trial judge's 
traditional function in applying the firsthand 
knowledge rule. The trial judge does not decide 
whether or not a witness has firsthand knowledge, 
but only whether sufficient evidence to support a 
finding of firsthand knowledge has been intro-
duced. If sufficient evidence has been adduced, 
the witness may testify and the jury decides 
whether or not the witness had firsthand 
knowledge. 
'RULE 603: OATH OR AFFIRMATION 
Rule 603 requires witnesses to swear or affirm 
to the truthfulness of their testimony prior to testi-
fying. Several constitutional and statutory provi-
sions also cover.the subject of oaths. Ohio Consti-
tution, article I,§ 7 provides: "No religious test 
shall be required, as a qualification for office, nor 
shall any person be incompetent to be a witness 
on account of his religious belief; but nothing 
herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths 
and affirmation." See also RC 2317.30; RC 3.20; RC 
3.21. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 
603 contains the following comment: "The rule is 
designed to afford the flexibility required in deal-
ing with religious adults, atheists, conscientious 
objectors, mental defectives, and children. Affirma-
tion is simply a solemn undertaking to tell the 
truth; no special verbal formula is required." Fail-
ure to administer an oath over objection was held 
reversible error in State v. Ballou, 21 App(2d) 59, 
254 NE(2d) 697 (1969): "We hold that to adduce evi-
dence through one not under oath ... over objec-
tion in a criminal case constitutes error prejudicial 
to the defendant." /d. at 61. 
RULE 604: INTERPRETERS 
Rule 604 governs the use of interpreters. In 
effect, an interpreter is a type of expert witness. 
Consequently, the rule provides that interpreters 
are subject to the "rules relating to qualification 
as an expert." Sef:! Rule 702. Rule 604 also pro-
vides that an interpreter is subject to the oath or 
affirmation requirement. See Rule 603. Unlike other 
witnesses, however, an interpreter does not swear 
or affirm thai he will testify truthfully, but rather 
that he will translate accurately. 
The rule does not control the appointment of in-
(tlt._:- terpreters or their compensation. The appointment 
\.'~' and compensation of interpreters is governed by 
statute. For example, RC 2311.14(A) provides: 
\() 
"" 
"Whenever because of a hearing, speech or other 
impairment a party to or witness in a legal pro-
ceeding cannot readily understand or communi-
cate, the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter 
to assist such person." 
Severaf cases have recognized a constitutional 
right to an interpreter in criminal cases, including 
the appointment of an interpreter for an indigent 
defendant. For example, in United States v. 
Carrion, 488 F(2d) 12 (1st Cir 1973), cert. denied, 
416 US 907 (1974), the court stated: 
Clearly, the right to confront witnesses would be 
meaningless if the accused could not understand 
their testimony, and the effectiveness of cross-
examination would be severely hampered .... If the 
defendant takes the stand in his own behalf, but has 
an imperfect command of English, there exists the 
additional danger that he will either misunderstand 
crucial questions or that the jury will misconstrue 
crucial responses. The right to an interpreter rests 
most fundamentally, however, on the notion that no 
defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an 
incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in 
punishment. /d. at 14. 
RULE 605: COMPETENCY OF JUDGE AS WITNESS 
Rule 605 provides that a judge is incompetent as 
a witness at a trial at which he is presiding. No ob-
jection is required to preserve the issue for appeal. 
The rule should be invoked only in a rare case. If 
the trial judge knows in advance of trial that he 
may be a witness, the judge should recuse himself 
prior to trial. See Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Canon 3(C)(1). Moreover, testifying as a witness in 
a case in which the judge is presiding should re-
~-· quire disqualification. In State v. Barber, 100 
App(2d) 71, 121 NE(2d) 438 (1954), the court stated, 
"The very nature of the judicial office ... preclude 
one who is a material witness in a case from sit-
ting as an impartial judge." /d. at 73. See also 
McMillan v. Andrews, 10 OS 112 (1859). 
RULE 606: COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS 
During Trial 
Rule 606(A) prohibits a juror from testifying in a 
case in which that juror is serving as a member of 
the jury. An opportunity to object to the compe-
. tency of a juror on this ground must be provided 
outside the presence of the jury. Rule 606(A) 
should be invoked only in a rare case because a 
person called as a juror may be challenged for 
~ cause if he has been "subpoenaed in good faith as 
a witness in the case." Grim. R. 24(8)(8); see also 
RC 2945.25(G). In addition, RC 2945.36(C) provides 
that a jury may be discharged without prejudice to 
the prosecution in a criminal case if "it appears 
the jury has been sworn that one of the jurors 
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is a witness in the case." 
Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments 
Rule 606(8) governs the impeachment of verdicts 
and indictments. Under the rule a juror is not com-
petent to testify about the internal operations or 
thought-processes of the jurors during the course 
of deliberations. The federal drafters provided the 
following explanation of the types of evidence that 
would be excluded under the rule: 
[T]he central focus has been upon insulation of the 
manner in which the jury reached its verdict, and this 
protection extends to each of the components of 
deliberation, including arguments, statements, discus-
sions, mental and emotional reactions, votes, and any 
other feature of the process. Thus testimony or affi-
davits of jurors have been held incompetent to show a 
compromise verdict, ... ; a quotient verdict ... ; specu-
lation as to insurance coverage ... ; misinterpretation 
of instructions ... ; mistake in returning the verdict ... ; 
interpretation of guilty plea by one defendant as impli-
cating others ... Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 606. 
A juror, however, is competent to testify about 
extraneous prejudicial information that has been 
introduced into the jury deliberation process. In 
addition, a juror is competent to testify about out-
side influences that have been improperly brought 
to bear on the deliberation process. "Thus, a juror 
is recognized as competent to testify to state-
ments by the bailiff or the introduction of a preju-
dicial newspaper account into the jury room ... " 
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 606. 
Unlike the federal rule, however, extrinsic evi-
dence of extraneous information or influence must 
first be introduced before a juror is permitted to 
testify about such matters. This has been de-
scribed as the aliunde rule. In State v. Adams, 141 
OS 423, 48 NE(2d) 861 (1943), the Supreme Court 
explained the rule as follows: "The so-called 
aliunde rule ... is to the effect that the verdict of a 
jury may not be impeached by the evidence of a 
member of the jury unless foundation for the intro-
duction of such evidence is first laid by competent 
evidence aliunde, i.e., by evidence from some other 
source." !d. at 427. Rule 606(8) recognizes one ex-
ception to aliunde rule. The rule does not apply in 
cases in which threats, bribes, attempted threats, 
attempted bribes, or other improprieties involve an 
officer of the court. This exception is based upon 
State v. Adams, 141 OS 423, 48 NE(2d) 861 (1943), 
and Emmert v. State, 127 OS 235, 187 NE 862 
(1933), which involved communications to the jury 
by bailiffs. 
RULE 607: WHO MAY IMPEACH 
Rule 607 permits a party to impeach his own wit-
nesses, thus abolishing the Ohio voucher rule. See 
State v. Adams, 62 OS(2d) 151, 157, 404 NE(2d) 144, 
148 (1980). 
Unlike Federal Rule 607, the Ohio rule imposes a 
Hmitation on the impeachment of a party's own 
witness by means of a prior inconsistent state-
ment. In such a ·case, impeachment is permitted 
only upon a showing of surprise and affirmative 
damage. This limitation was intended to prevent 
the circumvention of the hearsay rule. Except as 
provided in Rule 801(D)(1)(a), prior inconsistent 
statements constitute hearsay evidence, and thus 
are admissible only for the purpose of impeach-
ment. Without the surprise and affirmative damage 
requirements, a party could call a witness for the 
sole purpose of disclosing the prior inconsistent 
statement (hearsay) to the jury. An instruction 
limiting the use of the statement to impeachment 
probably would be ineffective. See Staff Note 
("Otherwise, the party would be entitled to call a 
known adverse witness simply for the purpose of 
getting a prior inconsistent statement into evi-
dence by way of impeachment, thus doing indirect-
ly what he could not have done directly.") 
The Ohio rule was taken verbatim from an article 
by Professor Michael Graham. Graham, Employing 
Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as 
Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Pro-
posed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 
801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1565, 
1617 (1977). This article provides guidance on how 
Rule 607 should be applied. In particular, Professor 
Graham notes: "The requirement of surprise may 
be inappropriate in criminal cases where impeach-
ment is by the criminal defendant: it could impede 
the defendant's right to confront the witnesses, to 
present a defense, and to produce witnesses on 
his own behalf." /d. at 1617. 
The Ohio cases have recognized that when a 
party is "surprised" by the testimony of his own 
witness, that party may question the witness about 
a prior inconsistent statement in an effort to 
refresh the witness's recollection. See State v. 
Dick, 27 OS(2d) 162, 271 NE(2d) 797 (1971); State v. 
Minneker, 27 OS(2d) 155, 271 NE(2d) 821 (1971); 
State v. Springer, 165 OS 182, 134 NE(2d) 150 
(1956). 
RULE 608: EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND 
CONDUCT OF WITNESS 
Opinion and Reputation Evidence 
Rule 608(A) permits the use of opinion and repu-
tation evidence to show a witness' character for 
untruthfulness. This type of impeachment is an ex-
ception to the general prohibition of the use of 
character evidence. See Rule 404(A)(3). Because 
the rule is limited to impeachment, it applies only 
after the witness whose character is subject to 
attack has testified. In this context, character is 
used circumstantially; a person with a poor 
character for truth and veracity is more likely to 
testify untruthfully than a person with a good 
character for truth and veracity. See also Rule 
803(20) (recognizing a hearsay exception for 
reputation evidence concerning character). 
The rule limits the type of evidence that may be 
used to impeach to the character trait of untruth-
fulness. See Staff Note ("only evidence relating to 
veracity is admissible."). This limitation is imposed 
in order "to sharpen relevancy, to reduce surprise, 
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waste of time, and confusion, and to make the lot 
of the witness somewhat less unattractive." Advis-
ory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 608. This 
aspect of Rule 608 is consistent with prior Ohio 
law. In State v. Scott, 61 OS(2d) 155, 400 NE(2d) 375 
(1980), the Supreme Court held: "In impeaching the 
credibility of a witness, inquiry into general reputa-
tion or character should be restricted to reputation 
for truth and veracity." (syllabus, para 3) (emphasis 
in original). Accord, Craig v. State, 5 OS 605 (1854). 
A foundation showing that the character witness 
is acquainted with the reputation of the principal 
witness must be laid before the character witness 
is permitted to state his opinion of that reputation. 
The Supreme Court described this foundational re-
quirement in Radke v. State, 107 OS 399, 140 NE 
586 (1923): 
[T]he impeaching witness must show on preliminary 
examination either that he has for some time lived in 
that community or done business in that community, 
or some other relation to that community that would 
qualify him to speak as to the community's general 
opinion touching the reputation of the party sought to 
be impeached. The preliminary qualifications of the 
impeaching witness must be such as to advise the 
court and the jury that he has the means of knowing 
such general reputation of the witness sought to be 
impeached in the community in which the witness 
lives. /d. (syllabus, para. 1) 
Rule 608(A) also provides that once a witness' 
character for truth and veracity has been attacked, 
opinion and reputation evidence showing that the 
witness has a good character for truth and veracity 
is admissible. The principal issue in applying this 
rule is determining what types of impeachment 
constitute attacks on character. The federal 
drafters provided the following guidance: "Opinion 
or reputation that the witness is untruthful specifi-
cally qualifies as an attack under the rule~ and evi-
dence of misconduct, including conviction of 
crime, and of corruption also fall within this cate-
gory. Evidence of bias or interest does not." Advis-
ory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 608. See Wick 
& Co. v. Baldwin, 51 OS 51, 36 NE 671 (1894) 
(evidence of good character for truthfulness after 
witness impeached with evidence of prior convic-
tion admitted). 
Specific Instances of Conduct 
Rule 608(B) provides that a witness on cross-
examination may be asked, subject to the trial 
court's discretion, about specific instances of con· 
duct if clearly probative of the witness' character 
for truthfulness. Extrinsic evidence of conduct, 
however, is inadmissible. Specific instances of 
conduct that have resulted in a conviction are gov-
erned by Rule 609, not Rule 608. 
As the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal 
Rule 608 indicates, the trial court's decision to 
admit such evidence is governed generally by Rule 
403. "[T]he overriding protection of Rule 403 re-
quires that probative value not be outweighed by 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or 
misleading the jury, and that of Rule 611 bars har-
assment and undue embarrassment." In this con-
text, however, Rule 403 must be read in light of 
Rule 608. Only evidence relevant to truth and ve-
racity is admissible. In addition, unlike Rule 403, 
Rule 608 requires the evidence to be "clearly" pro-
bative. The word "clearly" does not appear in the 
\ federal version of Rule 608, although it did appear 
in the revised draft of the Federal Rules. See 51 
F.R.D. 389 (1971). The word "clearly" was inserted 
in the Ohio rule in order to "require a high degree 
of probative value of instances of prior conduct as 
to truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness ... " 
Staff Note. 
RULE 609: EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
Rule 609 governs the admissibility of evidence 
of prior convictions offered for the purpose of 
impeachment. 
Types of Convictions 
Rule 609(A) limits the types of convictions that 
are admissible for the purpose of impeachment to 
convictions of (1) crimes punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year and (2) crimes 
of dishonesty and false statement, including ordi-
nance violations. These limitations were not recog-
nized under prior Ohio law. See RC 2945.42. In 
State v. Murdock, 172 OS 221, 174 NE(2d) 543 
(1961), the Supreme Court interpreted RC 2945.42 
as permitting the admission in evidence of all prior 
convictions, including misdemeanors. The court 
also held, however, that an ordinance violation 
was not a "crime" within the meaning of the 
statute. See State v. Arrington, 42 OS(2d) 114, 326 
NE(2d) 667 (1975); Harper v. State, 106 OS 481, 140 
N E 364 (1922). 
The rule differs from Federal Rule 609(A)(1) in 
one important respect. The federal rule contains 
an additional requirement. Prior convictions falling 
within this category are admissible only if the 
"court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the defendant." Thus, a federal judge has 
discretion to exclude the evidence even if the prior 
conviction involves a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year. 
In contrast, Rule 609(A) would appear to provide 
that convictions falling within this category are 
automatically admissible. Nevertheless, the Staff 
Note includes language that indicates that a trial 
court retains discretion to exclude prior convic-
tions that fall within this category. The Staff Note, 
after referring to the discretion recognized in the 
federal rule, states: "In limiting that discretionary 
grant, Rule 609(A) is directed to greater uniformity 
in application subject only to the provisions of 
Rule 403. The removal of the reference to the 
defendant insures that the application of the rule 
is not limited to criminal prosecutions." This 
Passage suggests that the drafters were not con-
cerned with eliminating discretion but rather were 
concerned with its uniform application. 
Rule 609(A)(2) provides that evidence of prior 
convictions involving crimes of dishonesty and 
false statement is admissible for the purpose of 
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impeachment. Convictions falling into this catego-
ry are automatically admissible; the trial judge has 
no discretion to exclude these convictions. The 
principal issue in applying this rule is determining 
what types of crimes involve "dishonesty" and 
"false statement." The Conference Report con-
tains the following comment: "By the phrase 'dis-
honesty and false statement' the conference 
means crimes such as perjury or subornation of 
perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzle-
ment, or false pretense, or any other offense in the 
nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which in-
volves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or 
falsification bearing on the accused's propensity 
to testify truthfully." H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Gong. 
2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. 
News 7098, 7103. Although theft offenses typically 
are thought of as involving dishonesty, it is uncer-
tain whether they are admissible under this provi-
sion in light of the legislative history of the rule. 
See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 
336-42 (1979); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Wein-
stein's Evidence ~609[03] (1978). 
Time limit 
Rule 609(B) provides that evidence of a prior 
conviction that satisfies the criteria of Rule 609(A) 
is nevertheless inadmissible if more than ten years 
has elapsed since the date of (1) conviction, (2) 
release from confinement, or (3) termination of pro-
bation, shock probation, parole, or shock parole, 
"whichever is the later date." The rule does 
recognize an exception. Such convictions may be 
admissible if the proponent provides sufficient ad-
vance written notice to the adverse party and the 
court determines, based upon "specific facts and 
circumstances," that the probative value of the evi-
dence substantially outweighs its prejudicial 
effect. See Annat., 43 ALA Fed 398 (1 979). 
Effect of Pardon and Expungement 
Rule 609(C) provides that evidence of a prior 
conviction is inadmissible if the conviction has 
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, expunge-
ment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equiva-
lent procedure based on a "finding of rehabillita-
tion," provided the witness has not been convicted 
of a subsequent crime punishable by death or im-
prisonment in excess of one year. In addition, evi-
dence of a prior conviction is inadmissible if the 
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, an-
nulment, expungement, or other equivalent proce-
dure "based on a finding of innocence." 
Except for the addition of the term "expunge-
ment," the rule is identical to Federal Rule 609(C). 
This addition was made because several Ohio 
statutes contain expungement provisions. See RC 
2953.31-36 (first offenders); RC 2151.358 Uuveniles); 
Comment, Expungement in Ohio: Assimilation into 
Society for Former Criminal, 8 Akron L. Rev. 480 
(1975). RC 2953.32(E), however, provides that a first 
offender conviction subject to expungement is 
nevertheless admissible in a criminal proceeding. 
As the Staff Note recognizes, the "rule conflicts 
with the provision of the statute." 
(. 
I 
Juvenile Adjudications 
In contrast to the federal rule, Rule 609(0) pro-
vides that evidence of juvenile adjudications of-
fered to impeach a witness is not admissible "ex-
cept as provided by statute enacted by the General 
Assembly." RC 2151.358(H) governs the admissibil-
ity of juvenile adjudications. It provides, in part: 
The disposition of a child under the judgment r~n-. 
dered or any evidence given in court is not adm1ss1ble 
as evidence against the child in any other case or pro-
ceeding in any other court, except that the judgment 
rendered and the dispositon of such child may be con-
sidered by any court only as to the matter of sentence 
or to the granting of probation. 
The courts, however, have recognized several ex-
ceptions to the statute. See State v. Cox, 42 OS(2d) 
200, 327 NE(2d) 639 (1975); State v. Marinski, 139 
OS 559, 41 NE(2d) 387 (1942); State v. Hale, 21 
App(2d) 207, 256 NE(2d) 239 (1969). 
Pendency of Appeal 
Rule 609(E) provides that the pendency of an 
appeal does not affect the admissibility of a prior 
conviction. Nevertheless, evidence of the pen-
dency of an appeal is admissible as affecting the 
weight to be accorded the prior conviction. Accord-
ing to the Staff Note, Rule 609(E) "is in accord 
with prior Ohio law." 
RULE 611: MODE AND ORDER OF 
INTERROGATION AND PRESENTATION 
Control by the Court 
Rule 611(A) provides that the trial court shall 
exercise reasonable control over the conduct of 
the trial including the mode and order of examin-
ing witn'esses and presenting evidence. In exercis-
ing this control, the court is to be guided by sev-
eral objectives: ascertaining the truth, avoi?ing . 
needless consumption of time, and protectmg Wit-
nesses from harassment and undue embarrass-
ment. The rule "covers such concerns as whether 
testimony shall be in the form of a free narrative or 
responses to specific questions, ... the order of 
calling witnesses and presenting evidence, ... the 
use of demonstrtive evidence, ... and the many 
other questions arising during the course of a trial 
which can be solved only by the judge's common 
sense and fairness in view of the particular circum-
stances." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 
611. 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. For 
example, RC 2945.03 provides: "The judge ?f the 
trial court shall control all proceedings dunng a 
criminal trial, and shall limit the introduction of 
evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant 
and material matters with a view to expeditious 
and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding 
the matters in issue." The Ohio cases also recog-
nized a trial court's authority to control harassing 
and embarassing examinations of witnesses. In 
Smith v. State, 125 OS 137, 180 NE 695 (1932), the 
Supreme Court held that questioning should be. 
prohibited "when a disparaging course of examma-
tion seems unjust to the witness and uncalled for 
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by the circumstances of the case." /d. (syllabus, 
para. 2); accord, Wroe v. State, 20 OS 460 (1870). 
Scope of Cross-Examination 
Rule 611(8) provides that the scope of cross-
examination may encompass "all relevant matters 
and matters affecting credibility." This rule is 
sometimes referred to as the wide-open or English 
rule. C. McCormick, Evidence 47 (2d ed. 1972). 
1 n contrast, Federal Rule 611 (b) adopts the Ameri-
can or restrictive rule on the scope of cross-
examination. Under that rule, cross-examination is 
"limited to the subject matter of the direct exami-
nation and matters affecting the credibility of 
the witness." 
Although it is clear that the prior Ohio cases did 
not follow the restrictive view. of the scope of 
cross-examination, they also did not fully endorse 
the wide-open view. According to McCormick, Ohio 
followed an intermediate view. See C. McCormick, 
Evidence 48 n. 43 (2d ed. 1972). In Legg v. Drake, 1 
OS 286 (1853), the Supreme Court expressed this 
view as follows: 
[A] party is not limited, in his cross-examination to the 
subject matter of the examination in chief, but m~y 
cross-examine [the witness] as to all matters pertment 
to the issue on the trial; limited, however, by the rule, 
that a party can not, before the time of opening his 
own case, introduce his distinct grounds of defense 
or avoidance, by the cross-examination of his adver-
sary's witness. /d. (syllabus, para. 5). 
Leading Questions 
Rule 611(C) follows the traditional view of pro-
hibiting leading questions on direct examination. 
The rule, however, recognizes a number of excep-
tions. Leading questions are permitted when "ne-
cessary to develop [a witness'] testimony" and 
when a party calls "a hostile witness, an adverse 
party, or a witness identified with an adverse . 
party." The exceptions include the "witness who IS 
hostile, unwilling, or biased; the child witness or 
the adult with communication problems; the wit-
ness whose recollection is exhausted; and undis-
puted preliminary matters." Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 611. As the Note also recog-
nizes this "matter clearly falls within the area of contr~l by the judge over the mode and order of in-
terrogation and presentation and accordingly is 
phrased in words of suggestion rather than com-
mand." See also Evans v. State, 24 OS 458, 463 
(1873) ("The allowing or refusing of leading ques-
tions in the examination of a witness must very 
largely be subject to the control of the court, in the 
exercise of sound discretion."). 
An adverse party and a witness identified with 
an adverse party are automatically considered 
"hostile" witnesses. See Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 611 ("The final sentence deals 
with categories of witnesses automatically re-
garded and treated as hostile."). 
RULE 612: WRITING USED TO REFRESH MEMOR' 
Rule 612 governs the use of writings used to 
refresh a witness' recollection. A different rule gov 
erns the hearsay exception for past recollection 
recorded. See Rule 803(5). 
During Trial 
The production and inspection of writings used 
.ta by a witness to refresh recollection during trial is 
''II mandatory. The language of Rule 612 making pro-
duction discretionary relates only to pretrial 
refreshment. The Ohio cases have recognized the 
right of inspection. For example, in State v. Taylor, 
83 App 76, 77 NE(2d) 279 (1947), the court held that 
"by not allowing the defendant the right of inspec-
tion of the document used by the witness [to re-
fresh recollection at trial], he was deprived of a fair 
trial ... " /d. at 83. Accord, State v. Moore, 74 Ohio 
LAbs 116, 139 NE(2d) 381 (CP 1956). 
Prior to Trial 
Rule 612 provides that production of a writing 
used prior to trial to refresh a witness' recollection 
may be required "if the court in its discretion 
determines it is necessary in the interests of jus-
tice ... " As proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Federal Rule 612 did not contain this limitation; 
production was mandatory. See 56 F.R.D. 276 
(1973). Congre~s, howev~r, ad~ed the. provision 
granting the tnal court d1scret1on. Th1s amen~r:nent 
was intended as a limitation. The House Jud1c1ary 
Report contains the following comment on the 
amendment: "The Committee considered that per-
mitting an adverse party to require the production 
of writings used before testifying could result in 
fishing expeditions among a multitude of papers 
which a witness may have used in preparing for 
trial." H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
7075, 7086. 
Criminal Rule 16 
Rule 612 contains an important exception. The 
rule does not apply to writings that are governed 
by Criminal Rule 16(B)(i)(g) and 16(C)(i)(d). Criminal 
Rule 16(8)(1)(g) provides for the inspection and use 
of prior written and recorded statements of prose-
cution witnesses. Such statements are subject to 
an in camera inspection after the witness has tes-
tified on direct examination. If the prior statements 
contain parts that are inconsistent with the wit-
ness' trial testimony, they may be used by the 
defense counsel for the purpose of impeachment. 
Criminal Rule 16(C)(1)(d) contains a comparable 
provision governing prior statements of defense 
Witnesses other than the defendant. 
Criminal Rule 16 statements are limited to prior 
written and recorded statements of the witness. 
Consequently, if a witness refreshes his recollec-
tion with other types of documents, Criminal Rule 
16 would not apply; Rule 612 would apply. Rule 612 
would not appy if a witness does not refresh his 
recollection with a prior written of recorded state-
ment. Nevertheless, Rule 16 may require produc-
~~ tion. Finally, in contrast to Criminal Rule 16, Rule 
612 does not require that the statement be incon-
sistent with the witness' trial testimony. 
RULE 613: PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES 
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Rule 613 governs the foundational requirements 
for the impeachment use of prior inconsistent 
statements. Ohio has followed the traditional view 
of admitting prior inconsistent statements only for 
impeachment. Under this view, the prior statement 
is offered to show the inconsistency between the 
witness' trial and pretrial statements and not to 
show the truth of the assertions contained in the 
pretrial statement. If offered for the latter purpose, 
the statement is hearsay. See McKelvey Co. v. 
General Casualty Co., 166 OS 401, 405 142 N E(2d) 
854, 856 (1957); State v. Duffey, 134 OS 16, 24, 15 
N E(2d) 535, 539 (1 938). 
The Rules of Evidence generally follow this view. 
There are, however, a number of exceptions. For 
example, under Rule 801(D)(i)(a) prior inconsistent 
statements taken under oath, ·subject to cross-
examination at the time made, and subject to pen-
alty of perjury may be admitted as substantive evi-
dence. Moreover, prior inconsistent statements 
that qualify as admissions of a party-opponent 
under Rule 801(0)(2) also are admissible as sub-
stantive evidence. 
Foundational Requirements 
Rule 613(A) provides that a prior written state-
ment need not be shown to a witness as a pre-
requisite to an examination on that statement. 
Thus the rule abolishes the requirement imposed 
by Q~een Caroline's Case, 2 Brad & Bing 284, 129 
Eng Rep 976 (1820). According to the Staff Note, 
this "represents a departure from prior Ohio law." 
See Stern & Grosh, A Visit With Queen Caroline: 
Her Trial and Its Rule, 6 Cap. U. L. Rev. 165 (1977). 
The rule does provide that the opposing counsel 
has a right to inspect the statement upon request. 
Rule 613(B) requires a witness be afforded an 
opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent 
statement before extrinsic evidence of that state-
ment is admissible. The rule follows prior Ohio 
law. In King v. Wicks, 20 Ohio 87 (1851), the 
Supreme Court held: "Before a witness can be 
contradicted by proving statements out of Court at 
variance with his testimony, he must first be in-
quired of, upon cross-examination, as to suc.h 
statements, and the time, place and person In-
volved in the supposed contradiction." /d. 
(syllabus). Accord. State v. Osborne, 50 OS(2d) 211, 
217-18, 364 NE(2d) 216, 221 (1977), vacated on other 
grounds, 438 US 91 1 (1 978). 
A foundation, however, is not required if the trial 
court finds that the "interests of justice" would be 
defeated by imposition of the foundational require-
ments. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal 
Rule 613 provides the following explanation of this 
provision: "In order to allow for such eventua~ities 
as the witness becoming unavailable by the t1me 
the statement is discovered a measure of discre-
tion is conferred upon the judge." 
RULE 614: CALLING AND INTERROGATION 
OF WITNESSES BY COURT 
Calling Witnesses by the Court 
Rule 614(A) recognizes the authority of the trial 
court to call witnesses on its own motion or at the 
behest of one of the parties. This includes the 
authority to call expert witnesses. The Ohio cases 
have recognized the trial court's authority to call 
witnesses. See State v. Adams, 62 OS(2d) 151, 404 
NE(2d) 144 (1980); State v. Weind, 50 OS(2d) 224, 
364 NE(2d) 224 (1977), vacated on other grounds, 
438 us 911 (1978). 
Interrogation by the Court 
Rule 614(8) recognizes the trial court's authority 
to question witnesses. The rule is consistent with 
prior Ohio law. See State ex rei Wise v. Chand, 21 
OS(2d) 113, 119, 256 N E(2d) 613, 617 (1970); C.A. 
King & Co. v. Horton, 116 OS 205, 211, 156 NE 124, 
126 (1927), dismissed, 276 US 600 (1928). 
In contrast to Federal Rule 614(8), the rule speci-
fically provides that interrogation of witnesses by 
the court must be conducted "in an impartial man-
ner." This requirement is implicit in the Federal 
rule. See Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 
614 ("The authority is, of course, abused when the 
judge abandons this proper role and assumes that 
of advocate ... "). The impartiality requirement is 
based on prior cases. In State ex rei Wise y. 
Chand, 21 OS(2d) 113, 256 NE (2d) 613 (1970), the 
Supreme Court held: "In a trial before a jury, the 
court's participation by questioning or comment 
must be scrupulously limited, lest the court, con-
sciously or unconsciously, indicate to the jury its 
opinion on the evidence or on the credibility of a 
witness." /d. (syllabus, para. 3) 
RULE 615: EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES 
Rule 615 governs the sequestration or exclusion 
of witnesses. The rule provides that witnesses may 
be excluded sua sponte by the trial judge or upon 
the request of a party, in which case exclusion is 
mandatory. The rule recognizes three exceptions. 
A party who is a natural person may not be ex-
cluded from the trial even though that party will be 
called as a witness. As the federal drafters noted, 
the "[e]xclusion of persons who are parties would 
raise serious problems qf confrontation and due 
process." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 615. Excluding a defendant from a criminal 
trial, in the absence of a waiver, is a violation of 
the right of confrontation. See Taylor v. United 
States, 414 US 17 (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 397 US 
8 
337 (1970). 
An officer or employee of a party which is not a 
natural person designated as its representative by 
its attorney may not be excluded from the trial 
even though that person will be called as a wit- 1 
ness. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal :!~ 
Rule 615 contains the following explanation of thi"s 
provision: "As the equivalent of the right of a 
natural-person party to be present, a party which is 
not a natural person is entitled to have a repre-
sentative present. Most of the cases have involved 
allowing a police officer who has been in charge 
of an investigation to remain in court despite the 
fact that he will be a witness ... " The Senate 
Judiciary Committee construed this exception to 
permit an "investigative agent" to remain during 
trial notwithstanding the possibility that he may be 
called as a witness. "The investigative agent's 
presence may be extremely important to govern-
ment counsel, especially when the case is com-
plex or involves some specialized subject matter. 
The agent, too, having lived with the case for a 
long time, may be able to assist in meeting trial 
surprises where the best-prepared counsel would 
otherwise have difficulty." S. Rep. No. ·1277, 93d 
Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code 
Con g. & Ad. News 7051, 7072. 
In In re United States, 584 F(2d) 666 (5th Cir 
1978), the court held that the trial judge had the 
authority under Federal Rule 611(a) to require the 
investigative agent to testify "at an early stage of 
the government's case if he remains the govern-
ment's designated representative under Rule 615." r;1 
/d. at 667. A court, however, does not have the 
same authority with respect to the testimony of a 
criminal defendant. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 
us 605 (1972). 
A person whose presence is essential to the pre-
sentation of the case may not be excluded even 
though that person will be called as a witness. The 
party seeking the person's presence during trial 
has the burden of showing that the person is 
essential to the presentation of its cause. This ex-
ception "contemplates such persons as an agent 
who handled the transaction being litigated or an 
expert needed to advise counsel in the manage-
ment of the litigation." Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 615. See also 6 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 1841, at 475 n. 4 (Cadbourn rev.1976). 
